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THE RIGHT TO (SAME-SEX) DIVORCE
Judith M. Stinson †
ABSTRACT
Divorces are granted every day in every state. In the vast
majority of cases, there is no question that the court can and
should grant the divorce. But in a growing subset of divorce
cases—those involving same-sex couples—courts are refusing to
consider requests for divorce on the merits. Six states and the
District of Columbia currently permit same-sex couples to marry,
yet thirty-eight states have either adopted constitutional
amendments or enacted statutes that prevent their courts from
recognizing those same-sex marriages validly entered into within
another jurisdiction. But what happens when a same-sex couple,
legally married in one jurisdiction, seeks to dissolve their
marriage in a state that prohibits the recognition of their same-sex
union? Most courts have thus far refused to grant a divorce to
same-sex couples on the ground that the court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear the matter. Yet the state where the couple was
married also lacks jurisdiction because the couple is not domiciled
there. This Article argues that denying any individual the ability to
divorce is improper. Civilized societies ought to permit divorce for
a variety of reasons, and providing access to a forum to adjudicate
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genuine disputes, including requests to divorce, avoids the
potential of violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Denying jurisdiction is unrelated to legitimate state
interests because by refusing to grant same-sex divorces, same-sex
couples remain married—the exact result about which the state
complains in the first instance.
“A Texas court has no more power to issue a divorce decree for a
same-sex marriage than it does to administer the estate of a living
person.” 1
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INTRODUCTION
Almost 5,000 divorces are granted in the United States each day. 2
In almost all cases, there is no question that the court has subjectmatter jurisdiction and no question that the court will ultimately grant
the divorce. 3 The vast majority of married couples in the United
1 Mireles v. Mireles, No. 01–08–00499–CV, 2009 WL 884815, at *2 (Tex. App. Apr. 2,
2009) (setting aside a prior Texas divorce decree and declaring the marriage void because the
former husband was born a biological female and hence, the underlying marriage was a void
same-sex marriage).
2 ROSE M. KREIDER & RENEE ELLIS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P70–125, NUMBER, TIMING,
AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 2009, at 20 tbl.11 (2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-125.pdf (showing 1,734,000 divorces granted in
2008; divided by seven days per week, about 4,750 divorces are granted each day, and using a
five-day work week, the number of divorces granted each day approaches 6,700).
3 See, e.g., HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (1988) (using the example that all states give an adulterer as
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States can exit their marriage with relative ease. Yet divorce is often
impossible to obtain in a growing number of cases—those where the
two parties involved in the divorce are of the same gender.
The problem stems from two sources: (1) inconsistent domicile
requirements for marriage and divorce; and (2) statutory or
constitutional provisions in most states that prohibit courts from
recognizing same-sex marriages. First, most states impose no
residency requirement for marriage, 4 but every state requires
residency for divorce. 5 Second, twenty-nine states have adopted
constitutional amendments that explicitly prohibit recognizing samesex marriages validly entered into in another jurisdiction, 6 and
another nine states have enacted statutes that prohibit recognizing
same-sex marriages. 7
And the problem is likely to grow exponentially in the near
future. 8 State-approved, i.e., “civil,” 9 same-sex marriage has been

much standing to sue as the “innocent” party, stating that “[d]ivorces are usually no longer
issued on a basis of marital misbehavior; courts grant them simply when one or both spouses
allege that their marriage has been irretrievably broken by irreconcilable differences”).
4 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 19 (2007) (requiring a three-day waiting period
to obtain a marriage license but imposing no requirement that the parties be Massachusetts
residents); HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
38 (1968) (stating that “[i]n a few states the waiting period is made longer for non-residents than
for residents,” which implies that in most states residents and non-residents can marry without a
waiting period).
5 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 4, at 144, 285–86 (indicating that most courts and states
have a residency requirement for divorce); Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce
Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1679 (2011)
(explaining that almost every state has residency requirements such that one or more of the
parties has to be domiciled in that state for divorce to proceed in that forum). This Article
focuses on state law because marriage and divorce are creatures of state, not federal, law. See,
e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (stating that domestic law is primarily a
state concern).
6 Those states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. William C. Duncan, Thirty (30) State
Marriage Amendments and Maine Question 1: Language, Votes, and Origins, reprinted in Lynn
D. Wardle, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Deciding, Democracy, and the
Constitution, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 951, app. 1 (2010). Hawaii is included within the Appendix;
Hawaii’s constitutional amendment, however, only states that the “legislature shall have the
power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples,” which it has done. Id. at 966 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
7 Those states are Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Washington, and West Virginia. See Christy M. Glass et al., Toward a ‘European
Model’ of Same-Sex Marriage Rights: A Viable Pathway for the U.S.?, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
132, 135 n.9 (2011) (listing all states that have either a constitutional amendment or statute that
prohibits recognition of same-sex marriages).
8 An estimated 80,000 same-sex couples are legally married in the United States, with
approximately 50,000 of them marrying in a U.S. state and the other 30,000 marrying in another
country, such as Canada; another 85,000 same-sex couples are in civil union-type relationships
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permitted in the United States for seven years; 10 it is currently legal in
seven states and Washington, D.C. 11 And the number of states that
permit same-sex marriage is likely to grow. 12

that provide the same benefits as marriage. Press Release, Williams Inst., Williams Institute
Experts Comment on Department of Justice DOMA Decision (Feb. 24, 2011), available at
http://freemarry.3cdn.net/f373007d99b7cff5f1_41m6bnchp.pdf.
Furthermore, a recent study estimates that over eight million American adults identify as
lesbian, gay, or bisexual; equal to “3.5% of the adult population.” Gary J. Gates, How Many
People are Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender?, THE WILLIAMS INST., 6 (Apr. 2011),
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-How-Many-People-LGBT-Apr2011.pdf.
9 Civil marriage has been described as “a publicly required contract” whereby the state
legitimizes the marital relationship. David Novak, Jewish Marriage and Civil Law: A Two-Way
Street?, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1059, 1070 (2000). Religious marriage, on the other hand,
whereby a religious institution legitimizes the bond, is now “a purely voluntary matter.” Id. This
Article is concerned only with civil marriage and divorce.
10 Massachusetts has permitted same-sex marriage since 2004. Maxine Eichner, Marriage
and the Elephant: The Liberal Democratic State’s Regulation of Intimate Relationships Between
Adults, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 25, 27 n.6 (2007).
11 Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, and
Washington, as well as Washington, D.C., permit same-sex couples to marry. CONN. GEN.
STAT. Ann. § 46b–20(4) (West Supp. 2011) (“‘Marriage’ means the legal union of two
persons.”); D.C. CODE § 46–401(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (“Marriage is the legally
recognized union of 2 persons. Any person may enter into a marriage in the District of
Columbia with another person, regardless of gender . . . .”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1–a
(Supp. 2011) (“Marriage is the legally recognized union of 2 people. Any person who otherwise
meets the eligibility requirements of this chapter may marry any other eligible person regardless
of gender.”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10–a (McKinney Supp. 2012) (“A marriage that is
otherwise valid shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or
different sex.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2010) (“Marriage is the legally recognized union of
two people.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (eff. June 7, 2012) (“Marriage is a civil contract
between two persons who have each attained the age of eighteen years, and who are otherwise
capable.”); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906–07 (Iowa 2009) (holding that Iowa’s statute
that prohibited same-sex marriage unconstitutional); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 969–70 (Mass. 2003) (finding that the Massachusetts law that prohibited same-sex
marriage violated the Massachusetts constitution).
12 For five years, Massachusetts was the sole state that permitted same-sex marriage. See
supra note 10; see also John R. Ellement & Jonathan Saltzman, R.I. Court Won’t Let Gay
Couple Divorce, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 8, 2007, at B1 (stating that Massachusetts was the first state
to permit same-sex marriage). In the past two years, however, six additional states and
Washington D.C. have joined Massachusetts in granting same-sex marriages. See supra note 11
(citing the states that permit same-sex marriage). Same-sex marriages will also be valid in
Maryland beginning January 1, 2013. MD. CODE ANN. § 2–201 (B) (effective Jan. 1, 2013)
(“[o]nly a marriage between two individuals who are not otherwise prohibited from marrying is
valid in this State.”) (replacing “[o]nly a marriage between a man and a woman is valid.”); 2–
202 (prohibiting marriages between certain blood relatives); MD. H.B. 438 (March 1, 2012).
Same-sex marriages were also lawful in California for a period of time after the state supreme
court ruled that the restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the state constitution. In
re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008). Following a voter initiative amending the
state constitution to prohibit same-sex marriages, a federal district court ruled the voter initiative
violated the federal constitution. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D.
Cal. 2010). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the district court, finding that
Proposition 8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Perry v.
Brown, 10–16696, 2012 WL 372713, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012).
Furthermore, the increasing availability of same-sex marriage internationally is likely to

4/12/2012 11:09:23 AM

2011]

THE RIGHT TO (SAME-SEX) DIVORCE

451

Considering that half of all marriages are projected to end in
divorce, 13 it stands to reason that some of the same-sex couples who
have legally married (or have entered a lawful civil union) 14 have
considered or filed for divorce. 15 And most of those couples probably
do not live in a state that recognizes their same-sex marriage, whether
the couple moved away from the state in which they married or
simply travelled there to obtain the marriage in the first place. But
what happens when a same-sex couple files for divorce in a state that
does not recognize same-sex marriage? 16

exacerbate this problem. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, State Regulation of Sexuality in
International Human Rights Law and Theory, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 797, 851–55 (2008)
(describing changes in the international landscape, including such actors as Europe, Canada, and
South Africa, with respect to same-sex marriage).
13 Stephen J. Bahr, Social Science Research on Family Dissolution: What It Shows and
How It Might Be of Interest to Family Law Reformers, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 5, 5 (2002). For a
state-by-state comparison of divorce rates, with Massachusetts touting the lowest percentage
and Nevada the highest, see I Don’t: Divorce Rates by State, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2010),
http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/st_DIVORCE_20100813.html. Even for those
married in the 1950’s, one out of every three couples divorced. STEPHANIE COONTZ,
MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 252 (2005).
Procedurally, one or both parties files a “petition for dissolution” to dissolve the marriage
or civil union. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Counselors and Gatekeepers: The Professional
Responsibilities of Family Lawyers in Divorce Cases, 79 UMKC L. REV. 417, 421 (2010) (using
“petition for dissolution” interchangeably with “divorce”). This Article uses the common term
“divorce” to refer to that process.
14 In addition to marriage, nine states (California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada,
New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington) currently offer same-sex couples
equivalent benefits under either civil union or domestic partnership laws. Marriage Equality and
Other
Relationship
Recognition
Laws,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf (last updated July 6,
2011). This Article generally focuses on marriages rather than civil unions or domestic
partnerships, although many of the arguments regarding divorce apply in those contexts as well.
15 See, e.g., John Schwartz, When Same-Sex Marriages End, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 2, 2011, at
SR 3 (discussing the problem of same-sex divorce); Associated Press, First Gay Marriage, Now
Gay
Divorce,
FOXNEWS.COM
(Dec.
10,
2004),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,141198,00.html (discussing the first same-sex divorces
in Massachusetts); Jessica Dye, New York Marriage Bill Paves Way for Same-Sex Divorce,
REUTERS (Jun. 25, 2011, 10:45 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/25/usgaymarriage-new-york-divorce-idUSTRE75O0GV20110625 (explaining that the New York
same-sex marriage law will replace the same-sex divorce law created on an ad hoc basis with
standard domestic relations law); Prominent Same-Sex Marriage Advocates Filing for Divorce,
CBS
SAN
FRANCISCO
(Jun.
7,
2011,
9:50
PM)
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/06/07/same-sex-marriage-advocates-filing-for-divorce/
(discussing the divorce of two same-sex marriage advocates in California); Rachel Holt, First
Celebrity
Gay
Split,
ERUDITION
(Nov.
2008),
http://www.eruditiononline.co.uk/article.php?id=322 (discussing the divorce of two British
celebrities).
16 The difficulty same-sex couples have obtaining a same-sex divorce has garnered
significant media attention. See, e.g., Sue Horton, The Next Same-Sex Challenge: Divorce, L.A.
TIMES, July 25, 2008, at A1 available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/25/local/megaydivorce25 (discussing a case of two women whose unsuccessfully attempted to divorce in
Rhode Island); Eve Conant, The Right to Love—and Loss, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 13, 2010, 8:00
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Generally, courts have refused to grant same-sex divorces on the
ground that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because of state
statutory or constitutional law. 17 This Article argues that states have
an affirmative obligation to grant all divorces, including those of
same-sex couples. Furthermore, granting those divorces allows courts
to avoid violating the United States Constitution’s guarantee of Due
Process.
A number of scholars have argued that states have an obligation to
grant same-sex marriages, primarily on constitutional grounds. 18
Some scholars have also addressed states’ obligation to recognize
same-sex marriages validly entered into elsewhere, again primarily on
constitutional grounds. 19 And a few have argued that states are

PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/13/the-right-to-love-and-loss.html (describing the
difficulties a same-sex couple experienced when ending their out of state marriage); Stephanie
Chen, Serious Legal Hurdles of Gay Divorce, CNN (May 3, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/201005-03/living/texas.gay.divorce_1_gay-marriage-gay-divorce-same-sex-divorce?_s=PM:LIVING
(discussing the uncertainty of obtaining a same-sex divorce in states which do not allow samesex marriage).
17 See infra Part I.B (discussing the reasons for which courts refuse to grant same-sex
divorces).
18 See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex
Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1186–87 (2004)
(discussing the use of substantive due process arguments to force states to recognize same-sex
marriages); Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: From Jim Crow to Same-Sex
Marriages, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2456, 2460 (1994) (stating current bans against same-sex
marriages should be rejected based on fundamental principles of freedom of association);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1425 (1993)
(noting that the prohibition against same-sex marriage could be considered sexual
discrimination and violate the Constitution); R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp,
Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 846–47
(2008) (discussing the constitutional implications of Perez and its effects on same-sex marriage,
where it constitutes identity-based restrictions); Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 667, 692–93 (2010) (characterizing the prohibition against same-sex marriage as
a form of sex-based discrimination that should form a suspect classification); Nelson Tebbe &
Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1382
(2010) (rejecting due process and equal protection as arguments supporting marriage for samesex marriages, but suggesting an equal access framework for rethinking the constitutional status
of nontraditional families).
19 See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX
MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES (2006); see also Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and
Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994
WISC. L. REV. 1033, 1040 (arguing for using choice-of-law rules to encourage recognition of
same-sex marriages out-of-state because it eliminates overbroad state interference into private
lives); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 921, 934 (1998) (arguing that there are a number of choice-of-law rules that could be used
by same-sex couples); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1966–68 (1997) (arguing that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause makes DOMA unconstitutional); Hillel Y. Levin, Resolving
Interstate Conflicts Over Same-Sex Non-Marriage, 63 FLA. L. REV. 47, 63 (2011) (discussing
Kramer’s position); Peter Nicolas, Common Law Same-Sex Marriage, 43 CONN. L. REV. 931,
934 (2011) (discussing current recognition of out-of-state common-law marriages amongst the
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obligated to recognize same-sex divorces entered elsewhere,20
generally on full faith and credit grounds. 21
But only a few scholars have addressed, even summarily, states’
refusal to grant same-sex divorces. 22 Regardless of whether states
permit or even recognize same-sex marriages, this Article addresses
states’ separate, independent obligation to grant divorces, including
for same-sex couples. 23

states); Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 2195, 2208–09 (2005) (discussing the recognition of extraterritorial marriages
amongst sister states); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional
Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2217–18 (2005) (discussing interests asserted by
courts that refuse to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages and whether those interests are
consistent with Supreme Court precedent).
20 See, e.g., Bradley J. Betlach, The Unconstitutionality of the Minnesota Defense of
Marriage Act: Ignoring Judgments, Restricting Travel and Purposeful Discrimination, 24 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 407, 410 (1998) (arguing that the federal Defense of Marriage Act violates
the Full Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution); Mark Strasser, Life After DOMA, 17 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 399, 404 (2010) (analyzing DOMA’s potential effect on same-sex
divorce); Kathryn J. Harvey, Note, The Rights of Divorced Lesbians: Interstate Recognition of
Child Custody Judgments in the Context of Same-Sex Divorce, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379,
1412–18 (2009) (discussing the issues faced by same-sex couples in child custody disputes).
21 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
22 L. Lynn Hogue, The Constitutional Obligation to Adjudicate Petitions for Same-Sex
Divorce and the Dissolution of Civil Unions and Analogous Same-Sex Relationships:
Prolegomenon to a Brief, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 229, 231 (2010) (arguing that the combination
of cases creating a right to divorce and requiring full faith and credit result in a constitutional
right to same-sex divorce); Joslin, supra note 5, at 1710, 1716–17 (arguing for the abandonment
of the domicile rule in divorce cases and suggesting that states “could amend their long-arm
statutes” to create personal jurisdiction over parties who marry within the state as well as require
parties marrying there “to consent to jurisdiction in the state for purposes of a subsequent
divorce of that marriage”); Herma Hill Kay, Same-Sex Divorce in the Conflict of Laws, 15
KINGS C. L.J. 63, 64, 84–85 (2004) (arguing, from a conflicts of law perspective, for legislation
in states that permit same-sex marriage to eliminate residency requirements for same-sex
divorce, as well as for recognition of divorce decrees entered in those states under an “incidents
of marriage” approach, and positing that constitutional objections “may exist” to courts refusing
to provide its citizens with access to the courts, specifically the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause); Colleen McNichols Ramais, Note, ‘Til Death Do You
Part . . . And This Time We Mean it: Denial of Access to Divorce for Same-Sex Couples, 2010
U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 1043 (arguing that Boddie v. Connecticut and the right to interstate travel
require states to grant same-sex divorces, even for civil unions and domestic partnerships).
23 A few other commentators have proposed practical solutions to the same-sex divorce
issue. See, e.g., F. H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 561, 592–98 (arguing that courts should recognize the “contractual” elements of
same-sex marriages, including divorce, but not more general government benefits); John M.
Yarwood, Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Mini-DOMA States, Migratory Same-Sex Marriage,
Divorce, and a Practical Solution to Property Division, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1355, 138796 (2009)
(arguing for adoption of the American Law Institute’s Principles of Family Dissolution or, in the
alternative, treating same-sex divorce petitions like claims for property dissolution by oppositesex cohabitating partners); Danielle Johnson, Comment, Same-Sex Divorce Jurisdiction: A
Critical Analysis of Chambers v. Ormiston and Why Divorce is an Incident of Marriage that
Should be Uniformly Recognized Throughout the States, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 225, 233
(2010) (arguing that courts could, following an “incidents of marriage” approach, grant samesex divorces without recognizing the marriage for other purposes).
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Part I of this Article traces the evolution of divorce law in the
United States. Although a divorce was initially impossible or very
difficult to obtain, states began permitting couples to divorce under a
variety of circumstances early in our nation’s history. Divorce laws
varied widely from state to state, and pressure to enact more stringent
divorce laws arose during the late 1800s and early 1900s. Yet by the
1970s, no-fault divorce became the norm, and until the last decade,
courts granted divorces liberally, even ex parte. That trend has
shifted, however, with states now refusing to grant certain divorces—
namely, those of same-sex couples.
Part II argues that granting same-sex couples the right to divorce,
including the right to access the courts, is both morally proper and
avoids constitutional concerns. Divorce should be permitted, from a
normative standpoint, for four main reasons. First, personal autonomy
suggests that states should not compel adults to remain married when
they no longer desire that relationship. Second, under the view that
marriage is, at least in some respects, a contractual relationship,
parties ought to be able to decide jointly that they no longer wish to
remain bound. Third, a number of legal obligations result from the
marriage, and refusing to permit divorce requires the parties to remain
liable for each other’s debts and torts, as well as to each other for
support. Finally, the right to remarry requires parties be able to
divorce, lest the state create bigamists or prevent marriages that they
would otherwise support.
Furthermore, principles of constitutional avoidance suggest that
states ought to respect the liberty interests of their citizens with regard
to the most basic familial relationships and permit divorce to avoid
conflicts with the Due Process Clause. Due process also requires
governments to provide citizens with an opportunity to litigate their
legitimate disputes. States do have legitimate interests in regulating
marriage, including divorce. But completely denying divorce to a
segment of the married population arguably violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Finally, this Article concludes that because divorce should be
permitted generally, and because divorce is fundamentally different
from marriage in that it terminates the familial relationship rather than
creates one, states ought to grant same-sex divorces despite their
interest in refusing to grant or generally recognize same-sex
marriages. 24
24 This Article does not address claims based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, either
by requiring states to give full faith and credit to the marriage or by requiring other states to
recognize the divorce, as contemplated by Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303
(1942). Similarly, it does not address restrictions on interstate travel, see, e.g., Andrew
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN DIVORCE LAW AND COURTS’
REFUSAL TO GRANT DIVORCES
State action is required in order for a couple to lawfully terminate
their marriage. 25 Despite the existence of common law marriage, 26
there is no corresponding common law divorce. 27 Early American
courts refused to grant divorces on policy grounds. Once divorces
became available, the grounds on which they were granted were very
limited. Finally, in the late 1960s, no-fault divorce emerged and any
interested party could obtain a divorce essentially at will. 28 That
ability remained for over forty years, but with the advent of same-sex
marriage, courts began to retreat from making divorce readily
available, at least in those cases.
A. From “No Divorce” to “No-Fault” Divorce
In early colonial times, divorce was difficult to obtain. 29 Following
independence, state laws varied widely. 30 Some states banned
divorces outright, and, of those that granted divorces, the more strict
states, such as New York, permitted divorce only in cases of

Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for
Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2162 (2005) (discussing the constitutional right to interstate
travel and its implications for same-sex marriages), or potential violations of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, see, e.g., Kay, supra note 22, at 84–85 (noting that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause could require states to extend access to their courts to same-sex couples).
Those claims have some merit, but the constitutional concerns raised in this Article are in
addition to those other constitutional claims.
Finally, the arguments made here apply to both “migratory” marriages—marriages where
the parties lawfully marry in the state where they reside, but later move to a state that would not
have permitted the marriage—as well as “evasive” marriages—marriages where the parties
explicitly travelled to a state that permits them to be married although their home state does not.
For a discussion on the differences between migratory marriages and evasive marriages, see
KOPPELMAN, supra note 19, at 102–10.
25 See, e.g., Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So.2d 266, 274 (Fla. 1973) (stating that “the matter of
divorce is a legislative prerogative”); Young v. Young, 178 S.W.2d 994, 997 (Ark. 1944)
(acknowledging that divorce is a province of states, and specifically of state legislatures).
26 As of 2009, “fifteen states and the District of Columbia recognize[d] common law
marriage under some circumstances.” Jennifer Thomas, Comment, Common Law Marriage, 22
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 151, 151 (2009).
27 See Peter Nicolas, Essay, Common Law Same-Sex Marriage, 43 CONN. L. REV. 931,
934 (2011) (noting that there is “no equally informal exit option, such as ‘common law
divorce’”).
28 For a good historical account of divorce in American, see Joanna L. Grossman, Fear
and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage and Some Lessons from the History of
Marriage and Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 87, 89–100 (2004).
29 Id. at 89. Grossman noted that the colonies “followed England’s ‘divorceless’
tradition.” Id. And although “[l]egislative divorce was sometimes available,” that practice was
abolished in the latter half of the 1800s. Id. at 89 n.11.
30 Id. at 90.
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adultery. 31 Other states, such as California, permitted divorce for a
number of reasons, including “neglect.” 32
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, in response to an increase in
divorce rates and to what were perceived as “liberal” divorce laws in
some jurisdictions, a number of states tightened their standards for
obtaining a divorce. 33 Furthermore, a number of federal constitutional
amendments were proposed between 1884 and the late 1940s that
would have authorized Congress to regulate both marriage and
divorce. 34 In the wake of those failed amendments, changing societal
attitudes, and continually increasing divorce rates, consensual
divorces became more available, despite laws that on their face
precluded them. 35
Finally, in the late 1960s, legal reform caught up to reality.
California adopted the first no-fault divorce law, 36 and the once-strict
New York amended its laws to permit more divorces. 37 The advent of
no-fault divorce, which allowed a party seeking to end his or her
marriage to do so without having to prove marital misconduct, 38 was
perceived as a “revolution.” 39 Despite this revolution, residency
requirements, which required at least one of the parties to reside in the
state for a period of time prior to filing a petition for dissolution,
minimized migratory divorces. 40 And many states still offered
31 Id. States in the South tended to be more restrictive, and South Carolina prohibited
divorces entirely. Id. at 89–90.
32 Id. at 90. Some states permitted divorce on vague grounds, such as Connecticut, which
allowed divorce for “misconduct”—meaning “any act that permanently destroys the happiness
of the petitioner and defeats the purpose of the marriage relation.” Id. at 91 (citation and
quotations omitted). This view was consistent with that of the pragmatists, who believed more
lenient divorce laws were “favourable to the virtue and happiness of mankind.” Id. at 90
(citation and quotation omitted).
33 Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 390 (2007).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 395, 404. Even ex parte divorces were approved as early as 1942. See Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302–04 (1942) (holding that a Nevada divorce was entitled to full
faith and credit in North Carolina, even though the divorce would violate North Carolina’s
public policy).
36 Lynn D. Wardle, No Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV.
79, 83.
37 Estin, supra note 33, at 406. For a comprehensive discussion of grounds of divorce
during the 1960s, see CLARK, supra note 4, at 327–58.
38 See Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence,
and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 719, 722–23 (outlining the
different permutations of no-fault divorce in the United States).
39 See, e.g., JACOB, supra note 3, at 43–79 (describing the origination of no-fault divorce,
and noting that while it was revolutionary, revision was accomplished rather peacefully); see
also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND
FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 188–90 (1989) (describing the variety
of original no-fault statutes).
40 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975) (upholding a one year residency
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statutory grounds for divorce, often with ramifications for property
division. 41 But within fifteen years every state in the nation had
adopted some form of no-fault divorce, 42 and the United States
Supreme Court made clear that due process required a “meaningful
opportunity to be heard” for those seeking a divorce. 43
Many viewed this revolution as a transformation from marriage as
a “status” 44 to treating the marital relationship like a “contract.” 45 By
recognizing more of the contractual elements of marriage, no-fault
divorce permitted more personal decision making. 46 And most

requirement as a prerequisite to a court’s jurisdiction over a divorce).
41 See, e.g., Copeland v. Copeland, 616 S.W.2d 773, 774–75 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981)
(requiring the complaining spouse to not only prove the alleged statutory ground of “personal
indignities” but also requiring, per the statute, that the complaining spouse’s testimony be
corroborated by another witness to be considered).
42 See JACOB, supra note 3, at 59, 80 (noting California’s law, the first no-fault divorce
regime, became effective in 1970 and by 1985 the last holdout, South Dakota, joined the rest of
the states and enacted a no-fault divorce regime); Ellman & Lohr, supra note 38, at 722
(discussing the repudiation of classic “full-fault” divorce “in every American state by the late
1970s”); Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New
Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1154 (1999) (explaining that by
1985 no-fault divorce was available in every state). Challenges to this no-fault regime were
generally unsuccessful. See, e.g., Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So.2d 266, 274 (Fla. 1973) (rejecting a
number of constitutional challenges to Florida’s no-fault divorce law and noting “the matter of
divorce is a legislative prerogative”).
43 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377, 380–81 (1971) (invalidating a filing fee
imposed on indigents petitioning for divorce).
44 See, e.g., Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I): From Status/Contract to the
Marriage System, 6 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 3 (2010) (acknowledging that family
law scholars tend to see marriage in these terms); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced
Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation under
No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 107 (1993) (arguing the “status” perspective, which was a
“view of marriage as something more than a purely consensual relationship,” provided the
“necessary basis for extensive state regulations”).
45 See Starnes, supra note 44, at 107 (noting that the “new emphasis on individual
fulfillment” was “at odds with extensive state regulation of marriage, and seemed especially
inconsistent with fault-based divorce laws, which often limited individual choice”). In 1973, the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act adopted the “contract” view when it defined marriage as “a
personal relationship between a man and a woman arising out of a civil contract to which the
consent of the parties is essential.” UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 201, 9A U.L.A. 175
(1998). Starnes noted that the Act defines the status of marriage as “arising out of . . . contract”
and the drafters’ reference “to a partnership model for divorce” suggested a contract model.
Starnes, supra note 44, at 108. Some scholars argue marriage inherently is and always was a
contract, but its terms were not always enforced and remedies for breach were not always
available. See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 869, 873–83 (1994) (discussing marriage’s terms and conditions).
Of course, marriage is neither entirely status nor entirely contract; in fact, the legal reality
is that marriage bears elements of both, and that they operate on a continuum. The more statusbased marriage is, the more state control over the relationship. The more contract-based
marriage is, the less state control. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 44, at 2 (noting that marriage has
elements of both status and contract).
46 See, e.g., Tracy A. Thomas, Elizabeth Cady Stanton on the Federal Marriage
Amendment: A Letter to the President, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 137, 156–57 (2005) (stating that
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scholars agreed that this was a welcome shift, especially in light of
the gender imbalances present under more traditional marriage
structures. 47
Even though the statutory requirements in no-fault jurisdictions
must be proven, such as the “irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage,” 48 most states permit unilateral divorces. 49 In the last two
decades, some courts have granted divorces in cases where they
would not have permitted the marriage in the first place, including
common-law marriages 50 and marriages of first cousins. 51 Divorces
have been permitted, primarily on equitable estoppel grounds, even

“the construct of marriage as a contract is clearly evidenced by the uniform acceptance of nofault divorce, prenuptial contracts, and separation agreements” and arguing that this “significant
legal evolution” restricts “the government's ability to continue to control the marriage relation
and its attendant privileges,” with the state being “divested of its power to restrict the individual
freedoms and privileges of the partners choosing the marital relation”).
47 See, e.g., Halley, supra note 44, at 15 (noting that “the onset of contractual freedom
between spouses is seen as necessary for marriage to be free and equal”). Similarly, from the
mid-1800s through the early 1900s, women in England were indicted for bigamy at a
substantially higher rate than men, suggesting gender bias. Patricia Cohen, As the Gavels Fell:
240 Years at Old Bailey, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2011, at C6.
Some scholars, though, claim that this “triumph of contract over status” was a mistake,
and that eliminating gender roles from the status rules would have been a better option. See, e.g.,
Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1365, 1367 (2001) (arguing that “contract is a poor model for intimate relations”); see also
Gaytri Kachroo, Mapping Alimony: From Status to Contract and Beyond, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 163,
255 (2007) (arguing that “no-fault divorce makes the consequences of the ‘status’ legacy come
to life” and these consequences are demonstrated in “the very real impact on women and
children”). Critics of no-fault divorce, however, “have identified the move from status to
contract as the underlying source of the problems with modern no-fault divorce law.” Elizabeth
S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, A Contract Theory of Marriage, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT 201, 201 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).
48 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Franks, 542 P.2d 845, 852 (Colo. 1975) (noting that
“although the dissolution of marriage statute was intended as a ‘no-fault’ divorce act, the actual
granting of the decree is not automatic or perfunctory under all circumstances” and requiring the
court to “weigh all the evidence and make its own independent determination” of irretrievable
breakdown). The Franks court went on to state that although Colorado’s no-fault divorce statute
“did eliminate all the former defenses to divorce in this state, it did not eliminate the necessity
of proving an irretrievable breakdown where that basic allegation is denied in the pleadings.” Id.
49 See Ellman & Lohr, supra note 38, at 722–23 (and noting that in the few states that do
not permit unilateral divorce, “spouses can divorce without any showing of fault if both of them
consent”).
50 See, e.g., Norman v. Ault, 695 S.E.2d 633, 635–36 (Ga. 2010) (granting a divorce from
a common-law marriage entered into in Alabama despite the fact that Georgia does not allow
common law marriages); Anderson v. Anderson, 577 So.2d 658, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(granting a divorce to a common-law marriage entered into in another jurisdiction). As of 2009,
sixteen jurisdictions recognized common-law marriages. Thomas, supra note 26, at 151.
51 See, e.g., Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So.2d 731, 742 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing
a marriage between first cousins entered validly entered into in a foreign country in order to
permit the parties to legally divorce); Cook v. Cook, 104 P.3d 857, 866 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005)
(recognizing a marriage between first cousins validly entered into in another state); Mason v.
Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706, 709–10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (same).
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when the state’s strong public policy prohibits the underlying
marriage, as in the case of bigamous marriages. 52
B. From “No-Fault” Divorce Back to “No Divorce”: The Case of
Same-Sex Divorce Petitions
Many scholars argue that American society is moving away from
seeing marriage as a contract and back to seeing marriage as a status 53
that is “fundamental to the social order, a permanent commitment of
the utmost importance, permeated by unshirkable obligation and
public normativity.” 54 The recent reintroduction of covenant
marriages, essentially what existed at common law prior to no-fault
divorce, is one attempt to return marriage to a more privileged status
position. 55 A movement to repeal no-fault divorce more generally is
also gaining momentum. 56
52 See, e.g., Heuer v. Heuer, 704 A.2d 913, 920 (N.J. 1998) (invoking quasi-estoppel to
prevent a spouse from calling a bigamous marriage invalid in order to benefit financially); Poor
v. Poor, 409 N.E.2d 758, 761–62 (Mass. 1980) (finding that a husband was estopped from
challenging the validity of this wife’s prior divorce); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 191 S.E. 507, 507
(N.C. 1937) (holding that one may not assert bigamy as a defense in divorce proceedings when
the bigamy is due to the party’s failure to remedy an invalid divorce decree); Lowenschuss v.
Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d 377, 386 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that husband is estopped from
asserting the marriage to be void due to wife’s divorce to a prior husband being procedurally
invalid as a defense in divorce proceedings based on equitable principles); Mayer v. Mayer, 311
S.E.2d 659, 669 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (same). Courts have granted a divorce even while
acknowledging the bigamous nature of the marriage and the policies against marriage by
estoppel. See, e.g., Farnham v. Farnham, 323 S.W.3d 129, 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (granting
a divorce to a wife, despite the marriage being “technically bigamous” and despite Tennessee’s
policies against recognizing bigamist marriages or marriage by estoppel).
Following similar principles in an estate case, a California court awarded half of the estate
of an immigrant from India to each of his two wives, despite California law generally treating
only the first wife as lawfully married and hence, the only person entitled to the estate. In re
Estate of Singh Bir, 188 P.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
53 See supra note 44 (citing sources that discuss marriage as a status).
54 Halley, supra note 44, at 3 (“Marriage as status is conservative not only in the sense
that it commits legal thought to using the institution to preserve tradition, but also in the sense
that it provides an inlet into contemporary legal thought about marriage for classical legal
ideas.”). Halley argues for an entirely new perspective, a “legal realist understanding of the
marriage system,” because the “very idea that marriage is anything—anything at all—is
symptomatically classical.” Id.
55 See, e.g., Katherine Shaw Spaht, Mulieris Dignitatem: The Vocation of a Wife and
Mother in a Legal Covenant Marriage, 8 AVE MARIA L. REV. 365, 366 (2010) (noting that in
Louisiana, Arizona, and Arkansas, “a couple who chooses to marry may choose a covenant
marriage, which consists of a legally enforceable agreement between the spouses to adopt a
more binding form of marriage than available under typical ‘no-fault’ divorce statutes”); see
also Caroline Bermeo Newcombe, The Origin and Civil Law Foundation of the Community
Property System, Why California Adopted it, and Why Community Property Principles Benefit
Women, 11 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 13 (2011) (explaining that
“[u]nlike a marriage based on ordinary contract law, a covenant marriage, at least under
traditional common law, was supposed to be more permanent”).
56 See, e.g., Ellman & Lohr, supra note 38, at 721 (discussing the movement to reinstitute
fault divorce).
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Yet even under a “fault” divorce scheme, parties can still obtain a
divorce. 57 They simply must claim one of the enumerated grounds. 58
Similarly, covenant marriages can be dissolved; 59 the available
grounds are fewer than under the current default provisions in most
states, 60 but the parties agree to those restrictions prior to entering into
the marriage. 61
But a new class of cases has developed where courts simply refuse
to consider petitions for divorce. Those cases involve petitions for
divorce by same-sex couples lawfully married in another
jurisdiction. 62 The problem arises because of residency requirements.
States do not impose residency requirements to be married. 63 But all
states impose residency requirements on a party seeking a divorce, 64
and moving to a state simply to obtain residency and file for divorce
can also preclude jurisdiction. 65 If the state where the parties reside
57 Id. at 722; see also Grossman, supra note 28, at 90 (noting that after the Revolutionary
War, “[a]ll states required that an ‘innocent’ spouse file for divorce on one of the legislatively
enumerated grounds”).
58 Those grounds varied widely by jurisdiction. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying
text (discussing the previous fault schemes that existed in the states before the no-fault
revolution).
59 See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 47, at 201 (noting that even in covenant marriages,
spouses can terminate the marriage).
60 See, e.g., Spaht, supra note 55, at 366 (citations omitted) (identifying the three
“distinguishing features” of a covenant marriage as: “(1) mandatory premarital counseling by a
member of the clergy or a professional marriage counselor; (2) an agreement to take reasonable
steps to preserve the marriage if marital difficulties arise; and (3) limited grounds for divorce,
ordinarily consisting of proof of a spouse’s fault or lengthened time periods of. [sic] living
separate and apart”).
61 See Stephen L. Nock et al., Covenant Marriage Turns Five Years Old, 10 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 169, 171 (2003) (noting that to enter into a covenant marriage, the parties must
“participate in premarital counseling with a state-recognized secular or religious counselor” that
explicitly covers “the restricted grounds for divorce”). Furthermore, the parties must present a
Declaration of Intent to the clerk of the court “affirming that marriage is for life, that each
partner has disclosed everything that could adversely affect the decision to marry, that
premarital counseling was received, and the agreement to take all reasonable efforts to preserve
the marriage, including marital counseling.” Id.
62 In one of the first same-sex divorce cases filed, on March 3, 2003 a Texas judge
“ordered a straightforward no-fault divorce decree and civil union dissolution.” Molly
McDonough, Court Oks Divorce Without Recognizing ‘Marriage’: Gay Couple's Civil Union,
Created in Vermont, Is Dissolved in Texas, Mar. 21, 2003, 2 No. 11 A.B.A. J. E.-REPORT 2
(Westlaw) (noting that Texas district court judge Tom Mulvaney “made headlines” when he
granted the same-sex divorce). The Texas Attorney General responded by requesting the judge
set aside the decree, and although the judge agreed to rehear the case, the petition was ultimately
withdrawn by the petitioners’ for financial reasons. Fred A. Bernstein, Gay Unions Were Only
Half the Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at ST2.
63 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
64 CLARK, supra note 4, at 285–86.
65 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 5 (West 2007) (emphasis added) (providing that
“a divorce may be adjudged” as long as “the plaintiff has lived in this commonwealth for one
year last preceding the commencement of the action if the cause occurred without the
commonwealth, or if the plaintiff is domiciled within the commonwealth at the time of the
commencement of the action and the cause occurred within the commonwealth,” “unless it
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refuses to grant a divorce, the result is that no forum is in fact
available and the parties must remain married.
In these cases, the courts conclude that lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction prevents them from considering the merits of the case. 66
These decisions rely on statutory construction: divorce statutes permit
courts to dissolve “marriages.” And most courts conclude that samesex unions, even if denoted “marriages” in the state where celebrated,
are not “marriages” for purposes of their states’ divorce laws.
In states with constitutional or statutory bans on same-sex
marriage, the analysis is relatively straightforward. For example, a
Texas Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court could not entertain a
petition for same-sex divorce 67 because Texas’s Constitution and
statutes provided that marriage consisted “only of the union of one
man and one woman.” 68 Thus, the state was statutorily and
constitutionally prohibited from giving effect to a same-sex marriage
entered into elsewhere. 69 Although the court was a court of general
jurisdiction and could hear cases in law and equity, 70 the “contrary
showing” limiting the definition of marriage deprived the court of
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the petition. 71 The court relied on
language from a prior case asserting that “[a] Texas court has no more

appears that the plaintiff has removed into this commonwealth for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce”).
66 See infra notes 68–79 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning behind courts’
refusal to grant same-sex divorces). Of course, if a court did accept jurisdiction, the judge could
still deny the divorce on the merits. But because of no-fault divorce statutes, it would be very
difficult, if not impossible, for a court to justify refusing to grant a divorce when the statutory
basis of irreconcilable differences was present.
67 In re J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App. 2010) (dismissing a divorce petition
by a same-sex couple married in Massachusetts for lack of jurisdiction and finding the Texas
law mandating this result to be constitutional); but see State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 436
(Tex. App. 2011) (holding the state lacked standing to appeal the grant of a divorce to a samesex couple married in Massachusetts), appeal filed No. 03–10–00237–CV (Tex. App. Apr. 23,
2011).
68 In re J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d at 663.
69 Id. at 663. Similarly, a Pennsylvania trial court held that the court was “without subject
matter jurisdiction to grant a divorce” to a lesbian couple married in Massachusetts. Kern v.
Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 558, 576 (Pa. Com. Pl. Mar. 15, 2010) (holding the court lacked
jurisdiction over the case and refusing to find the Pennsylvania marriage law, which precluded
their divorce, was unconstitutional). A Pennsylvania statute defined marriage as the union of
one man and one woman, and another statute declared same-sex marriages entered into
elsewhere were void. Id. at 562–63. “Without a legally recognizable marriage,” the court held,
“relief under the Divorce Code is simply not available.” Id. at 563. The court recognized that the
ruling meant the marriage remained valid in some jurisdictions. Id. at 576. The court further
noted that although the plaintiff had no remedy under Pennsylvania’s divorce statutes, she could
petition to have the marriage declared void. Id. It is questionable, however, whether that
declaration would be binding in Massachusetts or any state that recognized same-sex marriages.
70 In re J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d at 664.
71 Id.

4/12/2012 11:09:23 AM

462

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2

power to issue a divorce decree for a same-sex marriage than it does
to administer the estate of a living person.” 72
Even when the state constitution and statutes are silent in defining
marriage, general principles of statutory construction can lead a court
to conclude that divorce is not available to a same-sex couple. 73 In the
first appellate case in the country on this issue, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island ruled that the family court had no subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear a petition for divorce filed by a party to a
Massachusetts same-sex marriage. 74 The family court was a court of
limited jurisdiction, 75 able to grant a divorce only if there was a valid
marriage. 76 The court held that, based on both the plain meaning of
the word “marriage” and the legislative intent in 1961, when the
divorce statutes were passed, only unions between opposite-sex
couples were marriages. 77
Statutory language also led a New York trial court to dismiss a
same-sex couple’s divorce petition for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction in 2006 where the couple married in Massachusetts. 78
72 Id. at 666 (quoting Mireles v. Mireles, No. 01–08–00499–CV, 2009 WL 884815, at *2
(Tex. App. Apr. 2, 2009) (setting aside a prior Texas divorce decree and declaring the marriage
void because the former husband was born a biological female and hence, the underlying
marriage was a void same-sex marriage)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73 See Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 966 (R.I. 2007) (acknowledging the decision
created a hardship by leaving the parties without a remedy, but declaring that the court was not a
“policy-making branch” and any solution was up to the legislature).
74 Id. at 967. The issue had been certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court from the
family court.
75 Id. at 958.
76 Id. at 959 n.6.
77 Id. at 961–65. The same logic has been applied to civil unions. For instance, the
Appellate Court of Connecticut refused to dissolve a Vermont same-sex civil union for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 184 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
The court concluded that “the text itself, the rules of court, the legislative history, the strong
legislative policy against permitting same sex marriages and the relationship between other
statutes, legislative enactments of state policy and the common law” were consistent with
finding a same-sex civil union was not a “marriage” for purposes of the divorce statutes. Id. at
178.
78 Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856, 861 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (declaring the marriage void
and therefore dismissing the action for divorce, but permitting a claim based on a separation
agreement to proceed). The court held that the same-sex marriage was void both under New
York law as decided in Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (App. Div. 2005), and a 1913
Massachusetts law that provided marriages by non-residents were void if they would be void in
the state of residency. Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 858–59 (citation omitted). The court refused
to invalidate the parties’ separation agreement, however, even though it expressly resolved their
“property rights, and other rights and obligations growing out of the marriage relation.”
Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 857, 859.
In 2009, a New York court also ruled it had no power to grant a divorce to a same-sex
couple who had entered a lawful civil union, despite prior New York courts granting same-sex
divorces. B.S. v. F.B., 883 N.Y.S.2d 458, 463, 465–67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). The court
recognized the same-sex Vermont civil union as “validly and properly contracted,” but refused
to grant a divorce because the civil union did not constitute a “marriage.” Id. The court noted
that the parties were New York residents and hence, were not able to pursue petition to dissolve
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Similarly, an Oklahoma trial court, having entered a decree of
dissolution and later learning that the parties to the Canadian marriage
were both women, vacated its judgment. 79 News reports of unreported
decisions also suggest most courts are unwilling to grant same-sex
couples a divorce when the state in which they live refuses to grant
same-sex marriages. 80
A few courts, however, have considered petitions for same-sex
divorce on the merits. For example, despite the state not permitting
same-sex marriage at the time, some New York courts have
recognized a same-sex marriage validly entered into in another
jurisdiction for purposes of divorce. 81 One New York court found that
recognizing same-sex marriage was “consistent” with New York’s
public policy. 82 And in June 2011, the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled
that Wyoming law permitted the state to grant a same-sex divorce. 83
their civil union in Vermont, but the plaintiff “must be afforded a legal avenue to accomplish the
fair and equitable dissolution of her fractured relationship with defendant.” Id. at 467. The court
suggested she “may have a properly pleaded complaint for dissolution of the civil union heard
by the New York State Supreme Court which possesses the general jurisdiction to hear and
decide all equitable civil actions including actions which may also be heard by the Family
Courts.” Id.
79 See O’Darling v. O’Darling, 188 P.3d 137, 140 (Okla. 2008) (affirming in part the trial
court’s order vacating the divorce decree). The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the trial
court properly vacated its order because the petitioner failed to disclose that the parties were
both women and failed to disclose “controlling legal authority regarding same-sex marriage in
Oklahoma.” Id. at 139. The court also held that the court could not dismiss the divorce petition
without notice to the petitioner, and that the trial court on remand should “conduct a hearing,
after notice is given to the parties and the Oklahoma Attorney General’s office, allowing
Petitioner to argue if there exists facts that would entitle her to relief.” Id. at 140. In light of the
court’s holding that the order vacating the decree was proper, it is not clear what facts, other
than the parties not actually both being women, would preclude dismissal of the petition.
80 See, e.g., Associated Press, Neb. Judge Denies Divorce for Lesbian Couple, NEW ENG.
CABLE NEWS (Feb. 6, 2011, 12:37 PM), http://www.necn.com/02/06/11/Neb-judge-deniesdivorce-for-lesbiancou/landing_politics.html?&blockID=3&apID=6184baa939174deba253933567a3e93e (stating
District Judge Randall Rehmeier refused to grant a lesbian couple a divorce from a Vermont
marriage, but did approve a custody agreement).
81 C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884, 889 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding the New York court had
jurisdiction to grant a divorce to a same-sex couple married in Massachusetts); Beth R. v. Donna
M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding the court had jurisdiction to hear a divorce
petition for a same-sex couple married in Canada); see also Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850
N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (App. Div. 2008) (recognizing, for benefits purposes, a same-sex Canadian
marriage).
82 C.M., 867 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
83 Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 157 (Wyo. 2011) (reversing a district
court’s dismissal of a divorce petition resulting from a Canadian same-sex marriage and holding
the Wyoming court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case). The court reconciled the
Wyoming statute that prohibited same-sex marriage with another Wyoming statute that provided
“[a]ll marriage contracts which are valid by the laws of the country in which contracted are
valid in this state.” Id. at 155–56 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).
In a bench ruling with no written opinion, a New Jersey trial court also granted a divorce
on principles of comity to a lesbian couple married in Canada. Arthur S. Leonard, More on N.J.
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The Wyoming court recognized that district courts have “broad
subject-matter jurisdiction” 84 and asserted that the policy exception
precluding recognition of certain foreign marriages “is necessarily
narrow.” 85 It then concluded that:
[R]ecognizing a valid foreign same-sex marriage for the
limited purpose of entertaining a divorce proceeding does not
lessen the law or policy in Wyoming against allowing the
creation of same-sex marriages. A divorce proceeding does
not involve recognition of a marriage as an ongoing
relationship. Indeed, accepting that a valid marriage exists
plays no role except as a condition precedent to granting a
divorce. After the condition precedent is met, the laws
regarding divorce apply. Laws regarding marriage play no
role. 86
By petitioning for divorce to dissolve their marriage, which was
legally entered into in Canada, the parties were “not seeking to live in
Wyoming as a married couple,” and thus were “not seeking to enforce
any right incident to the status of being married.” 87 Respecting
Canadian law for the “limited purpose of accepting the existence of a
condition precedent to granting a divorce” was not, the court found,
“tantamount to state recognition of an ongoing same-sex marriage.
Thus, the policy of this state against the creation of same-sex
marriages is not violated.” 88
This approach acknowledges what Texas courts, which have stated
that a “Texas court has no more power to issue a divorce decree for a
same-sex marriage than it does to administer the estate of a living
person,” 89 have ignored. No court could find a living person dead,

Marriage
Recognition
Ruling,
LEONARD
LINK
(Feb.
25,
2009),
http://newyorklawschool.typepad.com/leonardlink/2009/02/more-on-nj-marriage-recognitionruling.html.
84 Christiansen, 253 P.3d at 155.
85 Id. at 156.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 156–57. In response to this ruling, the president of an anti-same-sex marriage
organization stated that she “will continue to encourage the Legislature to ‘correct’ the statutes
and allow people to vote on the so-called ‘defense of marriage’ constitutional amendment.”
Ashby Jones, Wyoming High Court Grants Divorce to Same-Sex Couple, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG
(Jun. 7, 2011, 1:27 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/06/07/wyoming-high-court-grantsdivorce-to-same-sex-couple/. The Wyoming Supreme Court earlier denied a petition to
intervene in the case filed by thirteen state legislators. Joan Barron, Wyoming Supreme Court
Reverses Same-Sex Divorce Ruling, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE (Jun. 7, 2011, 7:00 AM),
http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article_56d136c9-ea3c-54c6-b5db-39bf9fb28a48.html.
89 Mireles v. Mireles, No. 01–08–00499–CV, 2009 WL 884815, at *2 (Tex. App. Apr. 2,
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making administration of a living person’s estate both completely
impossible as well as unnecessary. But a court could find—and some
have found——a same-sex couple married, making their divorce both
possible and, when sought, necessary.
II. THE RIGHT TO DIVORCE AND TO ACCESS THE COURTS
The ability to divorce is important, and restricting individuals’
ability to divorce is morally problematic for a number of reasons.
First, when a government forces a person to remain married to an
individual who is no longer of his or her choosing, that person’s
personal autonomy is significantly reduced. Second, the perspective
that marriage is, at least in some sense, a contract rather than simply a
status suggests that divorce cannot be prohibited. Third, married
persons are often legally liable for their spouse’s actions, even absent
consent, and courts should not shackle a person with unwanted and
unintended liability. Finally, individuals cannot remarry if they
remain legally married to another person.
Furthermore, substantive due process suggests that individuals
possess a protectable right to divorce. Despite state restrictions on the
formation of a marriage, once a party is married, the state should be
obligated to acquiesce in the dissolution of that marriage if and when
the parties no longer desire to be married.
A. Personal Autonomy and Dignity
Whether or not marriage is viewed as a completely egalitarian
relationship, 90 the basic principles of individual autonomy 91 dictate

2009), quoted in In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 666 (Tex. App. 2010).
90 See Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
75, 77 (2004) (arguing for a vision of marriage, as an “egalitarian liberal community,” which
combines the benefits of community with equality and individual autonomy, protected through
the right of free exit).
91 “[R]espect for individual autonomy is a central principle of much of our ethical and
political theory . . . .” Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the Power of the Bet: Wagering with the
Government as a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 765
n.90 (1991); see also Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be
Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 426 (1992) (describing “individual human dignity” as a
“cardinal” belief in our “political culture” that “people have the moral right—and the moral
responsibility—to confront for themselves, answering to their own conscience and conviction,
the most fundamental questions touching the meaning and value of their own lives”); see
generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 69 (Allen W.
Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785) (connecting freedom with autonomy and
autonomy with morality); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 119–20, 127, 149–52 (Gertrude
Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859) (arguing that the freedom to act on one’s opinions
is an essential part of well-being).
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that adults are entitled to make decisions about their most important
relationships. Marriage is among the most important human
relationships 92—to decide with whom to live, maintain a household,
and be intimate. When adults 93 no longer desire to maintain the
marital relationship, the law should not require them to remain legally
entangled. 94 Very little is required to marry; only a simple application
and certification from the state is necessary. 95 But judicial
intervention is required to divorce, 96 and the state should not
eliminate access to that judicial process. 97
Marriage is a voluntary relationship. 98 People cannot be forced
into a marriage; 99 similarly, they should not be compelled to remain
married regardless of how deeply they desire to end it. 100
92 See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Liberalism’s Ambivalence, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 617, 617
(2010) (noting that “in the realms of intimate relationships and spirituality,” we observe “the
flowering of romantic ideas about individual freedom, self-expression, free love, spiritual
transcendence, and the whole structure of ideas surrounding privacy and autonomy in modern
liberal legal thought”); Mae Kuykendall, Emerson Family Values: Claims to Duration and
Renewal in American Narratives of Divorce, Love and Marriage, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.
69, 72 (2007) (describing marriage as “paradoxically both deeply private and important to the
constitution of citizenship”); see also E. Christian Brugger, Book Review, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 225,
231 (2010) (reviewing THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER INTIMATE
RELATIONSHIPS (Scott FitzGibbon, Lynn D. Wardle & A. Scott Loveless eds., 2010))
(describing marriage, for Kant, as “a vehicle for personal autonomy—an expression of adult
choice”).
93 These same principles do not apply with respect to adults’ relationships with children or
incapacitated individuals; in those instances, adults have a moral obligation to maintain the
relationship for the benefit of those who need to be protected. In the marital context, however,
the “disabilities” formerly placed upon women that would suggest an ongoing obligation to
remain married no longer exist. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 4, at 219, 222 (describing the limits
the law historically placed on married women to do certain things without their husbands and
those limits elimination).
94 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 91, at 426 (arguing that human dignity requires the right
to decided issues of value for themselves); Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy,
60 TEX. L. REV. 175, 177 (1982) (describing the “turn from liberty to autonomy” as reflecting
“a shift from higher law views that justified the liberal state as the means of achieving a specific
substantive goal, securing certain natural rights, to more relativistic stances that defend the state
because it allows for the pursuit of self-chosen ends, now held to be the only ends that are
legitimate”).
95 See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private
Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 117–18 (2001) (discussing the minimal formalities
required to form a marriage).
96 See id. at 119–120 (discussing marital dissolutions and comparing them to
administrative corporate dissolutions).
97 Some scholars criticize autonomy as a governing legal principle. See, e.g., Martha
Albertson Fineman, Evolving Images of Gender and Equality: A Feminist Journey, 43 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 437, 437 (2009) (attributing the unequal treatment of women to our valuing
“autonomy over equality,” thus sacrificing “substantive equality in the name of greater
independence, ignoring the realities of our shared states of episodic dependency and constant
vulnerability”). But few question its prominence. See, e.g., Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public
Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149, 163 (2010) (noting the
“ascendancy of the liberal commitment to autonomy and individual rights”).
98 See, e.g., Garrison v. Garrison, 460 A.2d 945, 947 (Conn. 1983) (upholding the validity
of a marriage in a dissolution proceeding because even though the parties did not intend to file

4/12/2012 11:09:23 AM

2011]

THE RIGHT TO (SAME-SEX) DIVORCE

467

B. Marriage as a Contract
The view that marriage is a contract also justifies the right to
divorce. 101 Just as parties can mutually decide to enter into an
enforceable contract, 102 parties to an existing contract can mutually
decide to exit that contract and the law will support those agreements
of rescission 103 and release. 104 Applying the contract theory to
marriage, 105 people have a right to decide the terms of their marriage,
including when to end it. 106

the marriage certificate, they did “intend to marry”); Tice v. Tice, 672 P.2d 1168, 1170–71
(Okla. 1983) (“Marriage is a personal relation which arises from a civil contract, and which
requires the voluntary consent of parties who have the legal capacity to contract.”); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Boober, 784 P.2d 186, 188–89 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that a decedent’s wife
was entitled to his life insurance proceeds despite their separation). The court in Boober
acknowledged the general proposition that marriage “is based on mutual consent” and that
“[e]ither party may withdraw consent by dissolving the marriage.” Boober, 784 P.2d at 188.
“Plainly, spouses can best judge the viability of their marriage.” Id.
99 Forced marriage is also banned by various international human rights conventions, such
as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). Jennifer Gong-Gershowitz, Forced Marriage: A “New” Crime Against Humanity?,
8 NW J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 53, 66 (2009) (discussing the CEDAW’s proscription of forced
marriages).
100 Some argue that divorce is impossible because there is no “real marriage” in the first
instance. See, e.g., Sherif Girgis et al., What is Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245,
246 (2011) (arguing for the “conjugal” view of marriage: “the union of a man and a woman who
make a permanent and exclusive commitment to each other of the type that is naturally
(inherently) fulfilled by bearing and rearing children together”). The authors claim that only
opposite-sex marriage is “real marriage” because only heterosexual intercourse involves
“organic bodily union.” Id. at 252–53.
101 Interestingly, a contract that impairs the right to marry might be unenforceable as
against public policy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 189 (1981) (“A promise is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy if it is unreasonably in restraint of marriage.”).
Furthermore, a contract theory of marriage is consistent with personal autonomy. See, e.g.,
Nancy S. Kim, Reasonable Expectations in Sociocultural Context, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
641, 642 (2010) (explaining that contract law is not designed to enforce “societal standards or
norms” and that contract law does not “force parties into contracts to which they have not
agreed, even if those contracts would be socially beneficial”). Kim also noted that “[o]ne of the
main objectives of contract law . . . is furthering personal autonomy—the ‘freedom to
contract.’” Id.
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1981) (providing that unless certain
narrow incapacitating conditions are present, “[a] natural person who manifests assent to a
transaction has full legal capacity to incur contractual duties thereby”).
103 Id. § 283 (providing that an “agreement of rescission is an agreement under which each
party agrees to discharge all of the other party’s remaining duties of performance under an
existing contract”; furthermore, an “agreement of rescission discharges all remaining duties of
performance of both parties”).
104 Id. § 284 (providing “[a] release is a writing providing that a duty owed to the maker of
the release is discharged immediately or on the occurrence of a condition” and that the release
“takes effect on delivery”).
105 As noted earlier, marriage in America is not truly a purely contractual matter; it has
elements of both status and contract. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. And the
view of marriage as both a status and a contract has persisted since at least 1932. K.N.
Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1932) (noting that the
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Although courts and commentators have recognized marriage as a
contract for over a hundred years, 107 treating marriage like a contract,
albeit a state-approved and regulated contract, began during the rise
of no-fault divorce. 108 Removing the vestiges of coverture 109 and
attempts to liberate women from the gender-rigid roles present in
traditional marriages 110 resulted in a shift toward allowing married
couples to create their own terms and conditions regarding at least
some aspects of the marital relationship. 111
By analogy, partnerships are also mutual agreements that establish
a legally enforceable relationship, 112 and formation brings particular

“law-books tell us of marriage as a ‘contract’ . . . and marriage as a ‘status’”). But to the extent
those contractual elements have grown over the past 200 years, they inform this argument. And
“the contractual nature of the modern law of marriage is indisputable” because of the “freedom
of parties to opt out of the state-provided legal rules.” Scott & Scott, supra note 47, at 236.
106 Although marriage is a social contract as well as a personal contract between the
parties, the rise of the contract theory of marriage corresponded with the rise in respecting
individual rights. See Estin, supra note 33, at 383 (discussing the intersection between the rise in
individual rights and the revolution in divorce law).
Henry Sumner Maine posited in the 1800s that law was moving to a contract theory,
proclaiming that “the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from
Status to Contract.” HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE
EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (Ashley Montagu ed.,
Univ. Ariz. Press 1986) (1864).
If marriage is treated like a contract, the ban on specific enforcement of personal services
contracts is arguably relevant. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981) (“A
promise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced.”). Under that provision, the
courts could not force an unwilling party to remain married; “damages” may be proper, but the
party would be entitled to exit the marriage.
107 See, e.g., Ponder ex rel. Graham v. Graham, 4 Fla. 23, 44 (1851) (declaring
unconstitutional a legislative act declaring a particular marriage dissolved because it impaired
“the obligation of a contract”); Franklin G. Fessenden, Nullity of Marriage, 13 HARV. L. REV.
110, 110 (1899) (acknowledging that whether “marriage is looked upon as a contract or as an
institution or as a status, it is perhaps the most important of all conditions in civilized
communities” and arguing the parties to a marriage have no power to dissolve the marriage
contract).
108 See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (discussing the shift from thinking about
marriage as a status to marriage as a contract).
109 “Coverture is the legal system that vested virtually all property rights to a couple’s
assets in the husband.” Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony,
82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2230 n.5 (1994). Williams argued that the current post-divorce
impoverishment of women and children results from treating men’s income as “entitlements”
under property law, allocating the “family wealth to husbands,” and treating women’s claims to
income under family law as a “discretionary redistribution.” Id. at 2229.
110 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 46, at 156 (discussing how recognition of women’s
individual liberties helped form the current terms of legal marriage).
111 See, e.g., Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of
a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1833 (1987) (noting that although the “status model
views marriage as defining and modifying . . . the identities of the marriage partners,” the
“contract model . . . conceptualizes marriage in terms of a series of rights and duties undertaken
by consent”).
112 See Calvin G. C. Pang, Slow-Baked, Flash-Fried, Not to be Devoured: Development of
the Partnership Model of Property Division in Hawai‘i and Beyond, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 5
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legal and social consequences. Yet when business partners no longer
desire to remain entangled, the state does not object to the dissolution
of their partnership. 113 True, the dissolution cannot be for the purpose
of evading creditors or for other fraudulent reasons. 114 But the
legitimate desire to end the business relationship is sufficient for the
law to permit that dissolution. 115
The rise in judicial enforcement of prenuptial and postnuptial
agreements is consistent with viewing marriage from this
perspective. 116 Although American courts previously refused to
enforce such agreements 117—either for lack of capacity 118 or as
against public policy 119—courts now generally recognize married

(1998) (“Analogizing marriage to a partnership, more specifically a commercial partnership,
was a legal construct largely necessitated by a nationwide turn toward no-fault divorces.”);
Cynthia M. Davis, Comment, “The Great Divorce” of Government and Marriage: Changing
the Nature of the Gay Marriage Debate, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 803 (2006) (internal citation
omitted) (analogizing marriage to a closely-held corporation, “especially concerning formation,”
which “‘requires application to and certification from the state’”); see also Laura W. Morgan &
Edward S. Snyder, When Title Matters: Transmutation and the Joint Title Gift Presumption, 18
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 335, 336 n.3 (2003) (“The theory of marriage as partnership
completely suffuses divorce law.”).
113 With a true “partnership,” no judicial approval is even necessary, making it more
similar to cohabitation than marriage. Davis, supra note 112, at 804. But for corporations
seeking to dissolve, they must file formal “articles of dissolution.” Id. at 803. They can dissolve
voluntarily, which Davis analogizes to no-fault divorce, or administratively. Id.; see also
Ertman, supra note 95, at 118–19 (analogizing corporate dissolutions to divorce).
114 See, e.g., Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexaming the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate
Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 11,
n.32 (1995) (discussing the dissolution incentive created when corporations can evade creditors
through dissolution).
115 See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Share Holders’ Reasonable
Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 199 (1988) (stating that corporations statutes permit
“voluntary dissolution” as well as providing methods for involuntary dissolution, such as
“dissolution on deadlock; dissolution for misconduct by those in control of the corporation; and
dissolution on broader grounds not necessarily related to misconduct”).
116 See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 47, at 203–04 (noting that the “contractual paradigm
is most evident in marital dissolution proceedings,” where the parties’ “separation and
premarital agreements” are routinely enforced by courts).
117 See, e.g., Sarah Ann Smith, The Unique Agreements: Premarital and Marital
Agreements, Their Impact Upon Estate Planning, and Proposed Solutions to Problems Arising
at Death, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 833, 840 (1991–1992) (noting early American courts’ refusal to
accept pre- and post-marital agreements). Some early courts, however, enforced prenuptial
agreements in equity, even though they were void under law. See, e.g., Tisdale v. Jones, 38
Barb. 523, 525 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860) (“It cannot be doubted at this day that a contract entered
into between husband and wife before marriage, although void at law, will be recognized and
enforced in equity.”).
118 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 117, at 840 (noting that until the mid-nineteenth century, a
woman’s legal identity merged with that of her husband).
119 Many courts refused to enforce support obligations in prenuptial agreements under the
view that those agreements were “destabilizing to the marital relationship and might promote or
encourage marital breakup.” Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Ky. 1990); see
also Smith, supra note 117, at 840–41 (discussing courts’ policy rationale behind voiding
certain prenuptial agreements).
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couples’ right to control the parameters of their marital relationship
with these types of agreements. 120 Similarly, divorce law itself
supports the contractual nature of marriage; consensual settlement
agreements are “particularly favored” in divorce cases. 121
By “allowing spouses to enter into stronger commitments than the
state’s default contract provides for,” 122 the view that marriage is a
contract is consistent with communitarian goals. 123 Similarly, the
return to offering covenant marriage options in some states, 124 despite
being an attempt to return marriage to a privileged status, 125 has been
described as a “milestone” in the “evolution of marriage from a
relationship based on status to one that is regulated by contractual
norms.” 126 Allowing the parties entering into a marriage to jointly
determine the standards by which they can divorce preserves their
right to contract, while at the same time allowing them to “voluntarily
undertake a greater marital commitment” than no-fault divorce
requires. 127
C. Legal Liability
The law imposes legal liability for one’s spouse. 128 For example,
married parties are obligated to each other for support. 129 And despite
120 See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 801 P.2d 495, 497, 499 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)
(overruling a 1926 case that held prenuptial agreements could not waive spousal maintenance);
Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d at 945 (overruling a 1916 case that declared prenuptial agreements
void); see also Homer H. Clark, Jr., Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 141, 142
(1979) (explaining that antenuptial contracts are valid and enforceable if they comply with
contract law); Smith, supra note 117, at 840–43 (tracing the history of prenuptial agreements).
Courts have also been willing to find and enforce oral agreements of property division and
support, even in the absence of a lawful marriage, unless the sole basis for the agreement is
illicit sexual services. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976).
121 See Weishaus v. Weishaus, 849 A.2d 171, 178 (N.J. 2004) (citation omitted) (noting
that “while settlement is an encouraged mode of resolving cases generally, ‘the use of
consensual agreements to resolve marital controversies’ is particularly favored in divorce
matters”); accord Dougan v. Dougan, 21 A.3d 791, 796 (Conn. 2011) (citation and quotations
omitted) (noting that a stipulated judgment in a dissolution “may be defined as a contract of the
parties acknowledged in open court and ordered to be recorded by a court of competent
jurisdiction”).
122 Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 878.
123 See, e.g., id. (arguing that, “[f]ar from undermining communitarian values, the language
of contract . . . is consistent with the language of commitment and obligation”); Scott & Scott,
supra note 47, at 208 (arguing that “contract can serve very well as a basis for an enduring,
committed relationship”); see also Clark, supra note 120, at 142 (emphasis added) (stating that
“if certain requirements of form and substance are met, the typical antenuptial contract is valid
and enforceable and in fact is favored by the law as tending to promote marital harmony”).
124 Under a covenant marriage, divorce can be granted only for fault, or, absent marital
fault, after a long waiting period. Nock et al., supra note 61, at 172.
125 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
126 Scott & Scott, supra note 47, at 201.
127 Id.
128 See, e.g., Ertman, supra note 95, at 117 (observing that spouses are often liable for
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not jointly entering into a commercial contract, spouses can be liable
for each other’s debts, at least for “necessaries” 130 and under “family
expense” statutes. 131 In community property states, this problem is
exacerbated. 132 Spouses can also be liable in tort under the family
purpose doctrine. 133 Insurance laws remove some of these
concerns, 134 but for uninsured parties and torts not covered by
mandatory liability insurance, the innocent spouse remains subject to
tort liability. 135
As long as spouses remain legally married, they could be subject
to liability for each other’s actions 136—even though they may
desperately desire to be freed from that legal obligation. Parties who
no longer share a committed emotional bond are less likely to be

debts incurred by their partner); Marie T. Reilly, In Good Times and In Debt: The Evolution of
Marital Agency and the Meaning of Marriage, 87 NEB. L. REV. 373, 399 (2008) (noting that
“[e]ven though divorce law reconstructs marriage as a contract at the will of the parties, marital
status—the fact that two people are married—triggers shared financial responsibility to third
parties without regard to the parties’ private agreement”).
129 See, e.g., Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 509 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (noting that
because the two women were married, “Plaintiff may be constrained to provide support for
Defendant and Defendant would be a recipient of a portion of Plaintiff’s estate”); Pang, supra
note 112, at 39–40 (recounting one state’s statutory “transform[ation]” of the “duty for the
husband to support his wife . . . into a duty by both spouses to support each other and their
family”); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Interstate Recognition of Lesbigay Adoptions,
3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 561, 591 (2005) (observing that marriage and adoption create legal and
familial ties that previously did not exist).
130 Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 838 (2004) (“[A]t
least thirty-three states recognize some form of the doctrine of necessaries. Under this doctrine,
spouses are prohibited from suing each other directly for support, but are obligated to pay each
other’s debts, if the debts are for necessary expenses.”); see also James L. Musselman, Once
Upon a Time in Bankruptcy Court: Sorting Out Liability of Marital Property for Marital Debt is
No Fairy Tale, 41 FAM. L.Q. 249, 251 (2007) (explaining that a spouse is liable for debts
incurred by their partner for items purchased for family use). Furthermore, a creditor’s rights
relating to existing debts are not affected by a divorce decree; however, post-divorce, the
spouses are no longer legally liable for each other’s debts. Id. at 259–60.
131 Reilly, supra note 128, at 399–400, 400 n.116 (describing statutes which establish a list
of goods for which the non-contracting spouse is liable if the contracting spouse fails to pay).
132 See William Houston Brown, 1 THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 6:85 (2011)
(explaining that in some states, creditors may pursue community property for separate debts,
and at times creditors may pursue separate property to satisfy community debts); Reilly, supra
note 128, at 400–01 (explaining that in some community property states creditors may collect
debts from either spouse if the spouse has the right to control).
133 See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 128, at 400 (describing “the ‘family purpose doctrine’ by
which courts imposed one family member’s tort liability on other solvent family members based
on family activities as joint enterprise”).
134 See id. (noting that the presence of mandatory automobile insurance laws addresses the
problem of driver insolvency).
135 See 8 AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 714 (2007) (noting that while
the mere familial relationship generally is not enough to establish liability, when a husband and
wife are engaged in a “joint enterprise,” liability of the driver may be imputed to the third
party).
136 See supra notes 128–35 and accompanying text.
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concerned for each other’s financial well-being, 137 creating an
incentive for abuse. Divorce law intends to resolve this problem by
severing these legal bonds: “The primary effect to be accomplished
by a divorce or dissolution is the separation of the parties in a manner
that enables each to continue his or her life as free as possible from
entanglement with the other.” 138 The absence of any forum for samesex couples to obtain a divorce prevents divorce law from fulfilling
this goal.
Although it is true that some states may not impose liability upon
the “spouses” they refuse to divorce—because they do not view them
as married in the first place 139—creditors with access to marriage
records may claim detrimental reliance or make a similar equitable
argument. 140 In addition, if one spouse moves to a state that does
recognize the marriage, whether to establish residency in order to
obtain a divorce or for other purposes, that spouse is very likely
subject to liability for the other spouse’s actions.
D. The Right to Remarry
The right to marry includes the right to remarry, and that right
depends on the ability to divorce. Every state prohibits bigamous
marriages, 141 yet without the ability to dissolve an existing marriage,
the parties cannot exercise their right to remarry 142 without
137 See Yuval Feldman & Shahar Lifshitz, Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty, 74 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 161 (2011) (noting that one characteristic of involvement is concern for
a spouses financial well-being).
138 Ward v. Ward, 599 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (terminating an alimony award
because the former wife had gained employment and acknowledging the husband was “not a
life-long guarantor of a higher standard of living”).
139 Ostensibly, just as a court could refuse to grant a divorce, a court could also reject a
creditor’s claim of spousal liability. The rationale would not likely be lack of jurisdiction, see
supra Part I.B, but would be simply lack of liability for want of a valid marriage.
140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Creditors arguably have a right
to rely on valid marriage records. Furthermore, it would be difficult for spouses to argue that
when they entered into the marriage relationship they did not intend to hold themselves out as
married or accept the benefits and responsibilities that came with marriage.
141 See, e.g., Diane J. Klein, Plural Marriage and Community Property Law, 41 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 33, 35 (2010) (noting that “[b]igamy is currently illegal in every state” and is
prohibited “by the state constitutions of five states”).
142 For purposes of this Article, we can presume the party seeking a same-sex divorce
wishes to remarry an opposite-sex partner, eliminating any debate about whether the right to the
subsequent marriage is a fundamental right.
Some scholars have argued that all state-sponsored marriage could cease to exist,
obviating the need for divorce. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228 (1995)
(arguing society should not consider marriage to be a “legal category”); Anita Bernstein, For
and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 166–191 (2003) (reviewing
arguments against continued state recognition of marriage); Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s
No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 28 (1996) (analyzing the potential legal and social
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committing bigamy. 143 And because marriage is a fundamental
right, 144 denying the ability to divorce is, in essence, denying the
ability to exercise this fundamental right. 145
States are free to impose some restrictions on divorce. For
example, compulsory mediation, 146 aimed to reduce the overall
divorce rates and aid the societal goal in having couples remain
married, may be proper. Similarly, residency requirements demanding
a plaintiff reside in the state for a set period of time prior to
commencing a divorce action are a reasonable means to avoid
migratory divorces. 147 But states must provide some ability for their
residents to obtain a divorce. 148

consequences of the abolition of state recognition of marriage); Dianne Post, Why Marriage
Should Be Abolished, 18 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 283, 283 (1997) (arguing for the abolition of
marriage). Because marriage is firmly entrenched as a fundamental right, it is questionable
whether eliminating state recognition would survive constitutional scrutiny. See infra note 144.
143 A recent symposium on family law posed this very hypothetical in the context of a
California same-sex couple who lawfully married there. Jennifer Ann Drobac, Jazzing up
Family Law: The First Annual Midwest Family Law Conference, 42 IND. L. REV. 533, 563
(2009). After a period of time, one spouse moved to Indiana. Indiana would not grant a divorce
because it refused to recognize the California marriage; thinking that the same-sex marriage was
void, the spouse in Indiana then married an opposite-sex partner. Id. The remarried spouse is
now “possibly a bigamist under California law and faces possible prosecution if she moves
back.” Id. at 564.
144 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking a ban on interracial marriage as
violating due process because the “freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness”); see also Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 99–100 (1987) (holding that prisoners have a constitutional right to marry);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–86 (1978) (upholding the right to marry even for people
behind on child support payments from prior marriage because “the right to marry is of
fundamental importance” and part of the Due Process Clause’s fundamental liberty).
145 By analogy, imagine the husband in Loving also married a Caucasian woman in
Virginia, which he could do because his previous marriage to an African-American was
considered illegal and not recognized. If he then moved to a northern state that permitted
interracial marriage, he could be arrested for bigamy because both marriages would be
recognized as valid.
146 Mandatory mediation is often used in child custody disputes. See Linda L. Berger, How
Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of
Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
259, 297 n.256 (2009) (noting that “mandatory mediation could take place before, not after, a
family is severed”); Art Hinshaw, Mediators as Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse:
Preserving Mediation’s Core Values, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 272 (2007) (noting that
“mandatory mediation” is “prevalent in child custody cases”).
147 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975) (upholding a one year residency requirement
as a prerequisite to a court’s jurisdiction over a divorce).
148 This rationale appeared persuasive to at least one trial court judge who granted a samesex divorce. See Leonard, supra note 83 (reporting the bench ruling in the case). The judge is
reported as saying:
I’m also concerned here that if the plaintiff wants to remarry in Canada that the way
her union with Kinyati Hammond is ended has impact outside the State of New
Jersey. She says in her certification, and I accept it as true, it’s undisputed that she
plans to return to Canada to be remarried. And if she goes with a document that says

4/12/2012 11:09:23 AM

474

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2

E. Avoiding Constitutional Conflicts
In addition to the normative arguments that support granting
divorces, there is an arguable constitutional problem created by states
refusing to grant same-sex divorces. Autonomy 149 also has
constitutional dimensions; 150 substantive due process protects
decisions about marriage and family. 151 More generally, liberty

dissolution of a civil union and what she had was a valid marriage in Canada, I think
she has a valid concern that there could be issues raised in Canada.
Id.
149 See supra Part II.A (discussing the intrusion into personal autonomy that stems from
states’ refusal to grant certain persons divorces).
150 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 91, at 426 (describing “individual human dignity” as a
“[c]ardinal” belief in our Constitution and “political culture more generally,” defined as “people
have the moral right—and the moral responsibility—to confront for themselves, answering to
their own conscience and conviction, the most fundamental questions touching the meaning and
value of their own lives”); Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing
Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CAL. L. REV. 47, 81 (2011) (arguing that personal
autonomy—the “power to make choices”—is central to protecting the “ability to participate
effectively in the democratic process” and “underlies all the individual rights protected by the
Constitution”); Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of Constitutional
Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247, 291 (2005) (addressing the Court’s
“positive emphasis on personal autonomy” in Lawrence v. Texas and noting that if “the
Constitution protects people’s prerogatives to live their lives as they see fit, then government
interference with an individual’s decisions about matters central to personal autonomy can only
be just if necessary to protect some other person’s concrete interest”); Smith, supra note 94, at
177 (describing the “turn from liberty to autonomy” as reflecting “a shift from higher law views
that justified the liberal state as the means of achieving a specific substantive goal, securing
certain natural rights, to more relativistic stances that defend the state because it allows for the
pursuit of self-chosen ends, now held to be the only ends that are legitimate”). Furthermore,
those protected rights “provide spheres of freedom from government intrusion on individual
choice.” Hessick & Hessick, supra note 150, at 81.
151 The Supreme Court held this right existed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). In Casey, the Court noted that “[o]ur precedents ‘have
respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.’” Id. (quoting Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). The Court concluded:

These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Id. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“[O]ur laws and tradition
afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (citations omitted) (“[F]reedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
Not all “all important, intimate, and personal decisions” are constitutionally protected.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997) (finding that Washington’s prohibition of
assisted suicide was constitutional). But marriage is protected, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights

4/12/2012 11:09:23 AM

2011]

THE RIGHT TO (SAME-SEX) DIVORCE

475

cannot be deprived without “due process of law.” 152 Divorce arguably
lies within the “domain of liberty” 153 protected by due process. And
denying same-sex couples the ability to divorce may “violate those
‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions.’” 154 Granting divorces to samesex couples avoids these constitutional problems. 155
Furthermore, the Supreme Court is wary of limitations placed on
the availability of a forum. 156 Specifically in the context of divorce,

essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”), as are “family living arrangements,”
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
152 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibition on states); U.S. CONST. amend. V
(prohibition on federal government).
153 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969).
154 Id. at 328 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
155 Equality concerns are also present. Equal protection arguments, however, are at least
arguably less likely to be successful than due process arguments. See Kenji Yoshino, The New
Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 794 (2011) (arguing that “equality” claims sound
more like pleas for “‘special rights’” and are, therefore, less persuasive than “liberty” claims,
which sound more like “‘human rights’” assertions). The reluctance of courts to hear divorce
petitions affects, as described above in Part I.B, primarily same-sex couples. Hence, courts are
arguably treating validly-married same-sex couples differently from validly-married oppositesex couples in violation of equal protection. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Over the past few decades the Supreme Court has declined to extend—and has even
curtailed—application of the equal protection doctrine. Yoshino, supra note 155, at 755–76. But
it has, at the same time, expanded the reach of the due process doctrine to fill that void. Id. at
776–87. Yoshino argues this result has occurred because our nation’s “pluralism anxiety”
requires that the Court resist expanding protected groups. Id. at 758. Instead, the Court identifies
common liberties that we all should possess. Id. at 776. Yoshino calls this the “‘liberty-based’ or
‘equality-based’ dignity claim.” Id. at 749; see also Shannon Price Minter, The Great Divorce:
The Separation of Equality and Democracy in Contemporary Marriage Jurisprudence, 19 S.
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 89, 107 (2010) (citation and quotations omitted) (arguing that it
“would be a mistake” to “distinguish equal protection and due process too categorically” and,
relying on the majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, pointing out that “[b]oth equal protection
and due process include a powerful equality norm, and their interdependence is a key feature of
American constitutional structure”); Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The
“Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1902 (2004)
(arguing that the Court, in Lawrence, blended “equal protection and substantive due process
themes”).
Yoshino asserts that this “liberty-based dignity claim” provides a means for the Supreme
Court “to ‘do’ equality in an era of increasing pluralism anxiety.” Yoshino, supra note 155, at
750. Other scholars note the power of this “dignity” claim, commenting that plaintiffs, in their
briefs in same-sex marriage cases, often state they are “dignity-deprived.” Elizabeth F. Emens,
Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and Countermarriage, 99 CAL. L. REV. 235, 237 (2011).
156 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 379 (1971)) (holding literal access to the courts is required by the Due Process Clause and
stating “[t]he Due Process Clause also requires the States to afford certain civil litigants a
‘meaningful opportunity to be heard’ by removing obstacles to their full participation in judicial
proceedings”); M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U.S. 102, 113 (1996) (recognizing termination of
parental rights as a civil case “in which the State must provide access to its judicial processes
without regard to a party’s ability to pay court fees”); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197–98
(1971) (requiring the City of Chicago permit an appeal for conviction of a city ordinance despite
the defendant’s inability to pay for transcripts, even though the defendant was not sentenced to
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the Court has held that barriers to access which preclude petitioners
from obtaining a divorce, such as fees imposed on the indigent,
violate due process. 157
In Boddie v. Connecticut, 158 the Court specifically required a
“meaningful opportunity to be heard” for parties seeking a divorce.159
The Court refused to declare that “access for all individuals to the
courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause . . . .” 160 But the Court singled out the nature of a
divorce action: “this right is the exclusive precondition to the
adjustment of a fundamental human relationship.” 161 The Boddie
Court relied heavily on the fact that court action was essential for a
party to end a marriage lawfully, 162 concluding that:
[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this
society’s hierarchy of values and the concomitant state
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this
relationship, due process . . . prohibit[s] a state from denying,
solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to
individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their
marriages. 163

jail and fined only a total of $500); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19–20 (1956) (plurality
opinion) (requiring access to an appeal for indigent criminal defendants).
When the Court does condone lack of a judicial remedy, some other avenue to resolve the
claim exists. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983) (denying a federal employee the
ability to sue his employer for defamation and retaliatory demotion because other substantive
and procedural provisions provided an opportunity for relief). As the Court noted, the issue was
“not what remedy the court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go unredressed.”
Id. at 388. Instead, the question was “whether an elaborate remedial system that has been
constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, should be
augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue.” Id.
157 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971). Ann Estin argues that beginning in
the 1940s, with Williams v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court began seeing divorce as an
individual right, whereby individuals were entitled to greater control over their marital status.
Estin, supra note 33, at 425. Estin argues this shift connected the Court’s divorce cases with due
process cases, although not articulated that clearly. Id. at 426.
158 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
159 Id. (“[D]ue process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of
overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the
judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”).
160 Id. at 382.
161 Id. at 383.
162 Id. (stating that in seeking a divorce, “resort to the judicial process is entirely a statecreated matter”).
163 Id. at 374. Estin asserts that “Boddie did not declare a constitutional right to divorce, but
it linked divorce to other familial rights protected by the Constitution.” Estin, supra note 33, at
427.
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The Court described marriage as involving “interests of basic
importance in our society” 164—interests that the state properly
oversees. 165 The Court could not identify any instance “where two
consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate themselves from
the constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage, and, more
fundamentally, the prohibition against remarriage, without invoking
the State’s judicial machinery.” 166 Because of the state’s monopoly,
the Court treated the plaintiffs seeking access to divorce similarly to
criminal defendants:
Thus, although they assert here due process rights as wouldbe plaintiffs, we think appellants’ plight, because resort to the
state courts is the only avenue to dissolution of their
marriages, is akin to that of defendants faced with exclusion
from the only forum effectively empowered to settle their
disputes. Resort to the judicial process by these plaintiffs is
no more voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the
defendant called upon to defend his interests in court. For
both groups this process is not only the paramount disputesettlement technique, but, in fact, the only available one. 167
Despite the Boddie Court’s strong language, states may impose
some limitations. For example, a one-year residency requirement
prior to filing for divorce does not violate due process. 168 The state
has an interest in “requiring that those who seek a divorce from its
courts be genuinely attached to the State.” 169 But a residency
requirement “is not total deprivation, as in Boddie, but only delay.
The operation of the filing fee in Boddie served to exclude forever a
certain segment of the population from obtaining a divorce in the
courts of Connecticut. No similar total deprivation is present” 170 when
the only bar to filing for divorce is a residency requirement. 171
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376.
Id.
166 Id. The Court distinguished marriage and divorce from commercial contracts, which
may be entered and rescinded freely; citizens may not “covenant for or dissolve marriages
without state approval.” Id.
167 Id. at 376–77.
168 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975).
169 Id. at 409. The Court also found the one-year residency requirement proper because the
proceeding was ex parte and the state’s finding of domicile was therefore not necessarily
binding on another state; to prevent collateral attack, the one-year requirement was reasonable.
Id. at 407–08.
170 Id. at 410.
171 Nevada retained the shortest residency requirement in the country for decades: six
weeks. See Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 25 FAM. L.Q. 417,
441 tbl.2 (1992). Many argue that the lenient laws of Nevada, as well as a few other states,
created the opportunity for “migratory divorce.” Grossman, supra note 28, at 91.
164
165
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Access to the courts is not required in all civil cases, though.172
The Court has distinguished Boddie from those circumstances where
denying access does not violate due process. For example, in finding
no constitutional right to file a bankruptcy petition, the Court
distinguished Boddie on several grounds, including the “state
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving marriage”; 173 the
fact that the “denial of access to the judicial forum in Boddie touched
directly . . . on the marital relationship,” which is of “fundamental
importance”; 174 and the government’s “control over the marriage
relationship,” as opposed to the “establishment, enforcement, or
dissolution of debts.” 175
Against that backdrop, the question is whether a state can justify
its refusal to grant some divorces. Without much doubt, states have a
legitimate interest in regulating marriage. 176 And states have some
legitimate concerns about granting divorces to same-sex couples to
172 See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (holding there is no
constitutional right to discharge debts in bankruptcy and hence refusing access based on
inability to pay the filing fee does not violate due process or equal protection).
173 Id. at 441.
174 Id. at 444.
175 Id. at 445.
176 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (noting that “reasonable regulations
that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may
legitimately be imposed”); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that “Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as national
security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage”); Mark Strasser, Same-Sex
Marriage and the Right to Privacy, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 117, 144–45 (2011) (acknowledging
that “[p]romoting marriage is considered a legitimate state interest”).
The state interests asserted for regulating the right to marry differ from those that can be
asserted for or against recognizing marriages or granting divorces to same-sex couples validly
married in another jurisdiction. The state interest asserted most frequently in the right to marry
context is preserving the traditional institution of marriage. See Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C.
558, 575–76, No. 09–10739, I.D. #2, 2010 WL 2510988 (Pa. Com. Pl. Mar. 15, 2010)
(discussing and accepting Pennsylvania’s asserted interest in the institution of marriage when
refusing to grant a same-sex couple a divorce); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor,
J. concurring) (disagreeing with Texas’s interest in preserving traditional marriage to support its
criminal sodomy laws).
In at least one same-sex divorce case, the court conflated these two issues. In re Marriage
of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 674 (Tex. App. 2010). In that case, the appellee characterized
“the rights in question as the ‘freedom to marry a person of one’s own choosing’ and the
concomitant right to end such a marriage with a divorce.” Id. The court therefore framed the
right at issue as the “right to marry a person of the same sex.” Id. at 675. The “legitimate [state]
interest” in prohibiting same-sex marriage was “promoting the raising of children in households
headed by opposite-sex couples.” Id. at 677.
Although this state interest is arguably valid in the marriage context, it is irrelevant in the
divorce context. If anything, this state interest provides a rationale for prohibiting opposite-sex
couples from divorcing; it does not provide a reason to prohibit same-sex couples from
divorcing. And at most it involves recognizing same-sex marriages, not granting them.
Similarly, Sherif Girgis, Robert George, and Ryan Anderson assert that permitting same-sex
marriage: (1) weakens real marriage; (2) obscures “the value of opposite-sex parenting as an
ideal”; and (3) threatens “moral and religious freedom.” Girgis et al., supra note 100, at 260,
262–63. These state interests, however, are also unrelated to divorce.
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the extent that it requires them to recognize the underlying marriage,
which might suggest approval 177 of same-sex marriages. 178 Moreover,
granting some divorces could require on-going state intervention for
purposes of support or child custody and that state involvement could
also legitimize the underlying relationship. 179
But Boddie arguably requires heightened scrutiny 180 when denying
access to a court—at least in the context of divorce. Although it did
not expressly delineate the right to divorce as a “fundamental right,”
the Court described access to the legal system as fundamental:
“Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is
more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of
rules defining the various rights and duties of its members, enabling
them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in
an orderly, predictable manner.” 181
The Court suggested some form of heightened scrutiny was
appropriate when it stated that “due process requires, at a minimum,
that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance,
persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the
judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.” 182 Because Connecticut refused to “admit these appellants to
177 This justification is similar to the “expressive or communicative” justification for
punishment, where punishment is conceptualized “as a form of communication that expresses
society’s moral condemnation of criminal wrongdoing.” Sigler, supra note 97, at 165.
178 See Michael E. Solimine, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, the Public
Policy Exception, and Clear Statements of Extraterritorial Effect, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 105,
124 n.64 (2010) (citing sources that discuss the policy rational for refusing to recognize samesex marriages). Tobias Wolff has articulated three rationales for states’ refusal to recognize
same-sex marriages entered elsewhere: (1) regulate sexual activity; (2) express moral
disapproval; and (3) dissuade migration to the state. Wolff, supra note 19, at 2218–37. Wolff
rejected the first interest because states can no longer regulate consensual sexual activity by
virtue of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). And states are no longer entitled, according
to Wolff, to express their moral disapproval of a particular group under Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
585 (O’Connor, J., concurring), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (striking
Colorado’s Amendment 2 as irrational because “its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the
reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests”). Wolff, supra note
19, at 2231–33. Finally, Wolff argued that states may not discourage migration to the state
under Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (stating that “a purpose to deter welfare applicants
from migrating to California” would be “unequivocally impermissible”). Wolff, supra note 19,
at 2236–37.
179 See, e.g., In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d at 666 (noting the “appellee seeks
to ‘give effect’ to his marriage under Texas law by seeking a division of the parties’ community
property in the event they are unable to agree on a property division”).
180 See Hogue, supra note 22, at 240 (referring to a “stricter standard of review because of
the fundamental character of the interest involved”). Even without heightened scrutiny, the state
cannot be motivated by animus. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 O’Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that such motivation “runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause, under any standard of review”).
181 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
182 Id. at 377 (emphasis added). Furthermore, in 1996 the Court described the
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its courts, the sole means in Connecticut for obtaining a divorce,”
unless Connecticut could demonstrate “a sufficient countervailing
justification,” the state impermissibly denied them due process. 183
The Court also discussed “other alternatives” available to the state, 184
which suggests it was applying more than a mere rational basis
analysis.
The Boddie Court ultimately held that “a State may not, consistent
with the . . . Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, preempt the right to dissolve this legal relationship without affording all
citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing so.” 185 To
reach this result, the Court relied on the fact that the right to access
the courts for a divorce “is the exclusive precondition to the
adjustment of a fundamental human relationship” and noted that
“resort to the judicial process is entirely a state-created matter.” 186
Even if a state’s interest in denying its residents access to a forum
to pursue a divorce is legitimate, this interest arguably does not rise to
the level of “overriding significance.” 187 First, states can grant
divorces without recognizing same-sex marriages for purposes of
marriage. Divorce is arguably “a ‘benefit’ of state residency, rather
than a ‘legal protection, benefit, or responsibility’ resulting from
marriage.” 188 Courts can grant divorces to same-sex couples lawfully

“fundamental interest at stake” in Boddie as “[c]rucial to our decision.” M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519
U.S. 102, 113 (1996). The Court also acknowledged the “fundamental importance” of “the
associational interests that surround the establishment and dissolution of th[e] [marital]
relationship.” Id. at 114 (citation and quotations omitted).
183 Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380–81 (emphasis added). The Court rejected the state’s interests in
preventing frivolous lawsuits, allocation of scarce resources, and balancing defendants’ rights to
notice with plaintiffs’ rights to access the courts. Id. at 381. The Court concluded that “none of
these considerations is sufficient to override the interest . . . in having access to the only avenue
open for dissolving their allegedly untenable marriages.” Id. The state interest involved here—
avoiding implicit approval of same-sex marriage—is stronger than the financial interests
asserted in many of the cases involving access to the courts. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509, 533 (2004) (noting that “ordinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot
justify a State’s failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of access to the courts”).
But even the interest of avoiding implicit approval does not appear to rise to the level required
by the Court. See infra notes 188–92 and accompanying text.
184 Boddie, 401 U.S. at 381.
185 Id. at 383.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 377.
188 State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 441 (Tex. App. 2011). The court also acknowledged
that the state statute at issue in Naylor, which resembled most states, could be interpreted the
statute’s “plain language” as precluding only “actions that create, recognize, or give effect to
same-sex marriages on a ‘going-forward’ basis, so that the granting of a divorce would be
permissible.” Id. The appellate court expressed “no opinion on the merit of these arguments,”
but concluded that “the fact remains that there are interpretations of [the Texas divorce statute]
that would allow the trial court to grant the divorce without finding the statute unconstitutional.”
Id. at 442.
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married in another jurisdiction and yet refuse, on traditional
“marriage” grounds, to provide benefits of marriage, such as tax
benefits, spousal immunity, and other rights, to those couples that
remain married in the state. 189
Second, the asserted state interests are not furthered by denying
divorce. Although those interests create an argument for denying the
right to marry, divorce is fundamentally different from marriage.
Contrary to marriage, which creates a new familial bond subject to
state control, divorce ends the familial relationship. 190 State interests
in divorce are not as profound as those relating to marriage. This
explains why states generally grant divorces even when they object to
the underlying marriage. 191
Because states generally have an obligation to permit divorces, and
because denying same-sex couples the right to divorce raises
significant constitutional concerns, states ought to grant divorces in
all cases, including those involving same-sex couples.
CONCLUSION
Divorce is commonplace in America. Yet for same-sex couples,
most of the courts that have considered their divorce petitions have
refused to address the merits, holding instead that they lack subjectmatter jurisdiction. These courts rely on state constitutional or
statutory provisions that prohibit recognizing same-sex marriages
entered into elsewhere, or simply on generic principles of statutory
construction, to find that there is no valid “marriage” to dissolve.
The problem is created in large part by residency requirements.
Same-sex couples often cannot get divorced in the state where they

189 See supra note 23 (citing commentators that argue under an “incidents of marriage”
approach, states can grant divorces without otherwise accepting the validity of an out-of-state
same-sex marriage).
190 See, e.g., Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 156 (Wyo. 2011) (noting that
recognizing a same-sex marriage for purposes of ending the marriage did not lessen the state’s
interest in preventing same-sex marriages); Wardle, supra note 129, at 590–91 (distinguishing a
judicial adoption decree, which begins a family relationship, from a divorce, which “terminates
an ongoing relationship” and requires no “further supervision of the spousal relationship”).
191 See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text (discussing states’ granting of divorces
to first cousins and bigamous marriages). Also, the Supreme Court requires that states recognize
divorce decrees of other states, Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302–304 (1942), even
when inconsistent with a state’s public policy. See, e.g., Rena M. Lindevaldsen, Same-Sex
Relationships and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Reducing America to the Lowest Common
Denominator, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 29, 65 (2009) (distinguishing a decision
“whether to nationalize a parentage standard through the full faith and credit obligation” as
raising “unique concerns that are not implicated to the same degree in the Supreme Court
precedent requiring a state to give full faith and credit to a divorce decree rendered in another
state even if the divorce decree violates the public policy of the receiving state”).
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were married because they are not (or are no longer) residents there.
But the state where they reside refuses to hear the case.
States have an interest in regulating marriage. 192 But they also
have an obligation—both morally and arguably constitutionally—to
permit parties to voluntarily terminate their marital relationship. This
is especially true when denying subject-matter jurisdiction results in
the complete absence of any forum to hear the dispute, creating a
“palpable hardship” to the married couple. 193 And because divorce
terminates the marital relationship, states do not have the same
interests in refusing to grant a same-sex divorce that they would in
either prohibiting a same-sex marriage or in recognizing an ongoing
same-sex marital relationship 194 within their jurisdiction. 195 Denying
the right to divorce means the same-sex couple remains married—
precisely the result the state objects to in the first instance.
At least five potential solutions emerge. First, courts can construe
their statutes (and constitutions, if applicable) to preclude furthering a
same-sex marriage but not dissolving it. This would permit courts to
assert subject-matter jurisdiction and grant same-sex divorces.
Second, courts of general jurisdiction can exercise their equity powers
to confer subject-matter jurisdiction, in order to avoid “palpable
hardship,” and grant same-sex divorces. Third, courts can construe
their statutes (and constitutions, if applicable) as violating the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process requirement and, accordingly,
find that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction and grant same-sex
divorces. Fourth, legislatures can repeal state statutes that prohibit
recognizing same-sex marriages. Fifth, legislatures can amend their
divorce laws to make it clear that even if state statutes generally

See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 966–67 (R.I. 2007) (asserting that the “court has
no power to grant relief in the absence of jurisdiction” and suggesting the legislature ought to
solve the problem, but acknowledging that “this observation may be cold comfort to the parties
before us”); see also supra note 148 (reporting another judge’s acknowledgement of the
hardship a same-sex couple would face if the court refused to grant the divorce).
194 The Wyoming Supreme Court recognized this in Christiansen. See supra notes 86–88
and accompanying text (discussing the Wyoming Supreme Court’s rationale for allowing a
same-sex couple to divorce in Wyoming); see also LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE
CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE LAW 228 (1981) (“Clearly, a less uniform and less
rigid legal system is needed in a pluralistic society as diverse and heterogeneous as ours”).
195 With regard to on-going court involvement, many states address these issues absent
marriage, Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856, 857, 861 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (enforcing the
parties’ million dollar separation agreement despite finding no valid Massachusetts same-sex
marriage), especially when they involve children, Jones v. Jones, 884 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2005) (granting custody of a minor child to the biological mother’s former same-sex
partner). See generally William B. Turner, The Lesbian De Facto Parent Standard in Holtzman
v. Knott: Judicial Policy Innovation and Diffusion, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 135
(2007) (discussing custody disputes between legally unmarried and same-sex couples).
192
193
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prevent recognizing same-sex marriages for purpose of marriage,
courts are empowered to grant same-sex divorces.
Finally, and perhaps the most appropriate, states that permit samesex marriage should provide a forum, without residency restrictions,
for same-sex divorce. 196 Residency requirements are at the crux of
this dilemma. States that helped create this conflict—those that grant
same-sex marriages—ought to help solve it.

196 After this Article was written, the District of Columbia passed a bill doing just that.
D.C. CODE § 16–902(b)(1) (effective April 19, 2012). That statute states:

An action for divorce by persons of the same gender, even if one of or neither party
to the marriage is a bona fide resident of the District of Columbia at the time the
action is commenced, shall be maintainable if the following apply:
(A) The marriage was performed in the District of Columbia; and
(B) Neither party to the marriage resides in a jurisdiction that will
maintain an action for divorce; provided that it shall be a rebuttable
presumption that a jurisdiction will not maintain an action for divorce if
the jurisdiction does not recognize the marriage.

